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SOME DIMENSIONS OF THE ‘QUALITY OF LIFE’
DURING THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
N. CRAFTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Some twenty years ago Hartwell and Engerman provided a superb
review of the key issues and the state of play of the standard of living
debate.  They distinguished between three questions which must be
addressed.  First, whether, given some set of exogenous changes, the
working classes were better off than they would have been without
industrialisation; second, whether, given the industrial revolution,
there was a counterfactual set of policies which would have
permitted the working classes to be better off; and third, whether the
standard of living of the working classes improved in the period
from, say, 1750 to 1850.
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Relatively little has subsequently been accomplished on the
first two questions.  On the issue of what happened, however, there
have been significant developments.  There has been substantial
progress in better measurement of real wage growth where there have
been several important contributions.
2 
 There has also been a major
research effort on heights.
3
  The results from this project are now
given prominence in the textbooks as an approach to measuring
changes in living standards which potentially is more comprehensive
than real wages — ‘Nutrition and the environment affect stature,
which can be taken as the summation of all influences on economic
welfare’.
4
Recent commentaries on the standard of living debate have
indeed stressed the need to move beyond real wages and have
anticipated renewed emphasis on measurement of broader concepts
of the standard of living.
5
  The heights literature can be thought of as
one way to get some insight into the ‘quality of life’.  Obviously,
there are many ways of defining this notion and formidable problems
of aggregation with which to contend.  It is desirable, therefore, to
2set out information relating to particular facets and also to consider
alternative indices proposed by investigators with different methods.
The most promising place to start seems to be with the much
discussed methodology adopted by the United Nations in the Human
Development Report and its more ambitious cousin, the approach to
comparing levels of well-being implemented by Dasgupta and
Weale.6 These notions of the quality of life stress the need to
consider capabilities rather than just incomes.  Development
economists informed by this view emphasise that there are policy
implications arising from it, in particular with regard to public
spending, which would not be accepted by the traditional income-
centred approach.
7
 Indeed, paying attention to the quality of life on
an internationally comparative basis may also help reinvigorate
research into the first two of Hartwell and Engerman’s questions.
In addressing this agenda, this paper investigates the following
questions
(i) What do different approaches to measurement imply about
changes in aggregate living standards during the British industrial
revolution?
(ii) Relative to other countries, what aspects of the quality of life
appear particularly unsatisfactory in mid-nineteenth century Britain?
(iii) How good is the correlation between levels of real GDP/person,
human development and the ‘quality of life’ in the ‘advanced world’
of the mid-nineteenth century?
(iv) What, if any, policy recommendations might a quality of life
approach have suggested for the improvement of British living
standards during the industrial revolution?
2. MEASURING THE QUALITY OF LIFE
3There is widespread agreement that real GDP/head or real wage rates
capture very important components of but are not comprehensive
measures of economic welfare.  At the same time, there is no
generally accepted index of a broader concept of living standards
and it is recognised that both the conceptual and practical problems
of measuring the quality of life are formidable.
Some of these points can be elaborated by reviewing the
contribution made by anthropometric research, which seems to be an
appropriate starting point given its recent high profile.  In fact, there
seem to be two different strands of thinking about the value of
research on heights among researchers in the area.  At times, height
seems to be suggested as a good index of welfare per se while at
other times it is suggested as a good diagnostic in a particular
historical situation that real income/wages are failing to measure
changes in welfare very well.
8 
 The latter seems to be much the more
defensible position.
The advantage of evidence on heights is that it is sensitive to
elements of living standards which are not captured by GDP or real
wages.  In particular, both work effort and the disease environment
are likely to be reflected in height.
9
  In the context of the British
industrial revolution this will tend to capture the impact of
urbanisation which was abnormally high by continental European
standards.
10
  In turn, this may well signal an important policy failure
in local government and thus a possible avenue to exploration of
Hartwell and Engerman’s second question.
Unfortunately, there are also serious difficulties in the use of
heights as a proxy for living standards.  It is essential to remember
that attained height is potentially sensitive to relative price effects
and that changes in prices as economic development proceeds may
result in moves to higher indifference curves being accompanied by
falls in height.  Komlos has stressed that this may have been the
implication of a rising relative price of food and thus of nutrition
during European industrialisation, while Weir has drawn attention to
the role of relative prices in the intra-household allocation of
resources and the tradeoff between quantity and quality of
children.
11
  Similarly, Williamson has argued strongly that the
4average British household accepted the worse environment in urban
areas as a price well worth paying for higher wages.
12
Clearly, it can also be maintained that there are important
components of living standards that are reflected neither in real
wages nor in heights.  These might include, for example, literacy
where levels may reflect public rather than private expenditure
decisions and civil and political rights which workers cared about
deeply during the industrial revolution and after.
While information on stature could in principle be used to
adjust standard national accounts concepts to reflect a broader
measure of economic welfare, in practice the information
requirements are severe and certainly exceed our current knowledge
in two fundamental respects.  First, we would need to devise a way
of avoiding double counting of the impact on height of expenditures
already included in GDP and, second, we need to find a way of
quantifying the welfare implications of changes in height.  More
precisely, we need a way of estimating willingness to pay for non-
private income influences on height since height per se is surely not
an argument in the utility function.
13
  This leaves only the second,
diagnostic, role for heights evidence at present.
The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations,
described and refined in successive editions of the Human
Development Report, is seen by its authors as a contribution to the
search for a better and more comprehensive measure of socio-
economic welfare than GDP.  It is the lives that people lead that are
taken to be of intrinsic importance rather than the incomes that they
enjoy.
HDI is a composite of three basic components: longevity,
knowledge and income.  Human development is seen as a process of
expanding people’s choices.  Income is seen as contributing to this
end primarily in the escape from poverty; above a threshold level it
is considered to make a sharply diminishing contribution to human
development, eventually tailing off to nothing.  Longevity, measured
by life expectancy, and knowledge, measured by a weighted average
of literacy and schooling, are regarded as central to the enhancement
of capabilities but not closely correlated with or strictly dependent
5on private income.  The components are combined in a single index
by measuring them in terms of the percentage of the distance
between the minimum and the maximum values travelled in each
case and averaging these scores into one index.
14
    Subject to data limitations, HDI can be calculated for subsets of a
country’s population or for the nation as a whole.  The UN also
publishes a version where account is taken of the distribution of
income  distribution  where  the  average  income  level  is adjusted
by
(1 - G) where G is the Gini coefficient of income inequality.  In
effect, this implies a rank-order (poorest to richest) weighting of
incomes and calculates the ‘equivalent’ level of income allowing for
the ‘cost’ of inequality.15  In the context of the standard of living
debate, this variant is also of interest.
The HDI approach to measuring the quality of life also has
obvious weaknesses.  In common with heights, the approach runs
into problems with regard to the weighting of different components
of well-being.  In this case, unlike with heights, it is at least possible
to work out the implicit set of weights involved which are closely
related to the choices for the maximum and minimum values for each
component.  When this is done, however, the results appear
arbitrary.  For the 1994 version of HDI, used in the calculations
reported later, a one unit increase in HDI would result from either
raising income by $(1990)15.56 or raising life expectancy by 0.18
years or raising literacy by 0.45 percentage points or schooling by
0.135 years.  This may be thought by many to weight education
rather heavily relative to life expectancy.
Obviously, it is interesting to investigate whether trends in HDI
and heights over time are similar.  HDI might also be interpreted as a
diagnostic to highlight misleading inferences about welfare from
GDP but is sensitive to different aspects of the problem.  A first
attempt at this has been made by Floud and Harris for Britain during
1756-1980; for the long-run, they find that there is a broad similarity
of movement which they regard as reassuring.
16
Other authors in the human development/capabilities tradition
stress that a key problem with HDI is that its coverage is too narrow.
6They argue that there are other key components of well-being which
depend on state provision rather than private income and should be
included in a more comprehensive index of the quality of life.
Dasgupta maintains strongly that it is important to extend the
concept of well-being to include rights in the political and civil
spheres and in this there is a clear echo of the approach taken to the
standard of living debate by radical writers like Thompson (1963).17
This seems attractive in principle — and certainly subsumes
important aspects of welfare unrelated to height — but raises two
formidable problems: how to measure rights and how to incorporate
them in an index with the other components of welfare.
Dasgupta and Weale suggest a way round these difficulties that
permits them to implement a broader quality of life evaluation of
well-being in a comparison of living standards in poor countries in
the 1970s.
18
 Six aspects of the quality of life are identified in the
DW index, namely, per capita income, life expectancy at birth, infant
mortality rate, adult literacy rate, and indices of political and civil
rights.  Countries are ranked on each of these characteristics.  This
facilitates inclusion of available indices of political and civil liberties
which typically rate countries on an ordinal rather than a cardinal
basis.  The Borda Rule is then used to provide a way of aggregating
such ordinal data.  This ranks each observation on each criterion and
then sums its scores to obtain an aggregate score on which its Borda
ranking is then based.
Dasgupta and Weale use indices of political and civil rights
judgmentally assigned on a scale of 1 to 7 and taken from Taylor and
Jodice.  These attempt respectively to measure “the extent to which
people are able to play an active and critical role in the choice of
their leaders” and “the extent to which people are openly able to
express their opinions without fear of reprisals”.
19
  Political liberty is
the sole concern of the political rights index while freedom of the
press and independence of the judiciary are the central ingredients
judged in the civil rights index.  Precise definitions are given in the
appendix.
Despite the attractions of this approach, there are clearly also
large drawbacks.  While the simplicity and transparency of the
7Borda Rule are appealing, this does not dispose of the weighting
problem which bedevils all exercises in this area.  Thus, two ‘votes’
are given to each of rights and mortality but only one to income and,
of course, any cardinal information which may be available on trade-
offs between components (for example, longevity and wages) is
ignored.  Assessments of rights are inherently subjective and the
concept embraced by Dasgupta and Weale may not be easily
calibrated for the early nineteenth century or may be thought not to
correspond closely with the concerns of the citizens of the time.  No
account is taken of income distribution and others have argued that a
wider range of values should be included, although, data permitting
the approach is flexible enough to be adapted to reflect these
concerns.20
Two alternative approaches to the weighting problem in the DW
index have been proposed and which are defined more precisely in
the appendix.21 One is to note that it will not matter in cases of
Pareto Dominance, ie, where a comparator is better or at least as
good on all components.  The second is to experiment with
weighting schemes to see whether they make much difference in
practice as long as all components of the index are retained, a
procedure that has been termed ‘Intersection Borda Ranking’.
It follows from this discussion that it is clearly desirable to
move beyond both GDP per head and heights in considering changes
in economic welfare or the quality of life.  Given that there is no
ideal procedure to adopt, it seems best to set out information on
possible components of well-being separately and to compare the
outcomes of different methods of aggregation.
3.      AGGREGATE LIVING STANDARDS IN BRITAIN
DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
In this section, data are assembled for Britain in benchmark years
familiar from the standard of living debate with a view to
implementing the conceptual approaches set out above.  The aim is
to address the first of the questions posed in the introduction,
8namely to assess changes in living standards and to compare different
indices of socioeconomic welfare.  The results are presented as a
stimulus to further research along these lines by a wide range of
historians rather than as a definitive set of conclusions.  Table 1
reports estimates of various aspects of well-being while Table 2
shows the indices discussed in the last section.  Data for life
expectancy and literacy are taken from the obvious, well-known
sources listed in Table 1; the remaining estimates require some
discussion.
Maddison provides estimates for UK GDP per head for 1820
based on obtaining a purchasing power parity adjusted estimate of
1992 income and working backwards using growth rates for GDP.
This measures income on a very similar basis to that used in the HDI
estimates of the UN.  To obtain figures for Britain, Ireland was taken
out on the basis proposed by Maddison.  Income levels for other
years were worked forward or back from 1820.22
The estimates on height contained in Table 1 represent the
work of Floud et al.  This has been the subject of some debate and
Komlos has recently argued that alternative statistical procedures
should be adopted to cope with truncation biases in the raw data.
His results would eliminate the increases in average height through
1820 and would suggest decreasing height from the 1760s to the
1780s with a very slight recovery through the 1830s followed by
further decline to the 1850s when height is estimated to be 1.3%
lower than in the 1760s.
23
It is well-known that detailed evidence on infant mortality in
Britain prior to civil registration of deaths from 1837 has been
relatively sparse.  The Cambridge Group have recently filled this gap
based on family reconstitution evidence and their new results are
adopted in Table 1.24  Schooling is based on Matthews et al’s well
known estimate extrapolated backwards using literacy rates.
25
  This
seems to be the only feasible way to proceed.  It may not be ideal
but is probably reasonable given the close correlation between adult
literacy and previous school enrolment rates found across counties
in mid-nineteenth century Britain.
26
9Table 1 attempts to assess rights in Britain during the industrial
revolution period on a similar basis to that of Taylor and Jodice.
The detail of this may well be contentious even if the principle is
regarded as acceptable and the relevance of such an exercise to
workers’ well-being certainly requires some justification.  It should
be noted that for comparisons through time of British conditions
using the Borda Rule only relative rankings need to be accurate not
actual scores.
The key to being coded 1 or 2 for political rights is the ability
of a wide electorate to vote a leader or party out of office, with a 1
awarded if the great majority of persons can participate in the
electoral process.  The very restricted franchise both before and after
the Reform Act of 1832 clearly rules out a 1.
27
  Consideration of the
operations of parliament and the nature of the ‘party system’ before
the Second Reform Act of 1867 also seems to rule out a 2 since
governments were sustained or defeated in parliament and were not
determined by popular vote in general elections.
28
  On the other
hand people could vote for their representatives in regular elections
even if, to modern eyes, the procedures appear to have been non-
democratic.  A 3 seems justified throughout the period covered by
the standard of living debate.  Workers were effectively denied
suffrage throughout and, from their point of view, a constant ranking
would also be applicable.
Assessing an appropriate score for civil rights is much harder
and the situation was much more changeable.  By the later
eighteenth century, it may be reasonable to speak of the
independence of the judiciary and it has recently been argued that in
general the ideology of the law served to constrain authority not to
rely on coercive power.
29
  Nevertheless, the period between the
French Revolution and the later 1820s should be seen as one of
severe repression of workers’ rights reflected in the Combination
Acts and the use of the military to suppress popular disturbances
with 12,000 troops used against the Luddites in 1812.  From the
mid-1830s to 1850, the general trend is one of easing of repression
and major advances for working class organisations such as trade
unions, coops and friendly societies.
30
10
In terms of press freedom, the picture until late in the day is
one of substantial interference by government and suppression
through heavy taxation and the law of seditious libel.  Pressure on
the press was intensified during the period of repression identified
above (for example, the ‘six Acts’ of 1819).
31
  The reductions in
stamp duty after 1836 and the availability of a defence of truth
against a charge of criminal libel after 1843 led to rapid increases in
newspaper circulation including radical organs like the Chartist
Northern Star (founded 1837).
32
The ratings of civil rights in Table 1 are necessarily tentative.
Further work is highly desirable, in particular since more attention
needs to be paid to women’s rights.  There does, however, seem to
be reasonable justification for the relativities over time, particularly
with regard to workers, who might be expected to care especially
about trade union rights and a radical press.  Further support for this
view might be found in the flowering and withering of Chartism
between the 1830s and the 1850s.
33
A central feature of Table 1 which seems likely to be robust to
subsequent refinements of the estimates is that of disparate
movement of the various indicators.  For example, in the early years,
while growth in income and real wages is at best very modest, life
expectancy and perhaps height improve but civil rights deteriorate.
After 1830, income and real wages grow more quickly and civil
rights improve markedly, mortality conditions worsen and heights
decline, perhaps appreciably.  This conflicting pattern of changes
both emphasises the potential importance of looking at broader
measures of living standards than private income but also underlines
the difficulty of arriving at an index of well-being which commands
general assent.
Table 2 presents some indices of living standards which can be
compared not only with each other but also with the income and
heights variables of Table 1.  The DW and HDI and Distribution-
Adjusted HDI indices have already been described in Section 2.
GDI refers to the Gender-related Development Index recently
devised by the UN as a complement to HDI and given great
prominence in the 1995 Human Development Report.  This simply
11
adjusts the average attainments in each component of HDI in
accordance with the degree of disparity in achievement between
women and men.  The weighting formula expresses a ‘moderate
degree’ of aversion to inequality.  Precise details both of the
definition and the arithmetic calculation are shown in the appendix.
The HDI offers a quite optimistic assessment of aggregate
trends in well-being during the industrial revolution.  Its upward
movement reflects improvements in literacy, schooling and life
expectancy which on balance augment the rise in incomes.  The
behaviour of this index is in sharp contrast with that of heights,
particularly if the Komlos series for heights is used.  The long-run
tendency to similar movements in heights and HDI emphasised by
Floud and Harris seems to have broken down in the early nineteenth
century.34
The Distribution-Adjusted HDI is difficult to estimate because, as is
well-known, data on income distribution only exist for a few years
and are highly imperfect.  Williamson reworked the available
material to obtain Gini coefficients based on the work of the political
arithmeticians for 1759, 1801 and 1867 but his estimate for the last
of these years appears to be flawed and Feinstein’s revision is surely
preferable.35  In Table 2 the Gini for 1867 is assumed also to apply
to 1850.  Feinstein’s revision means that the Gini coefficient would
vary only slightly through time whereas Williamson’s shows rising
inequality over time.  British income distribution was highly unequal
throughout the period and the Distribution-Adjusted HDI level is
well below that of HDI; even on the Williamson estimate for 1867,
however, there are clear improvements between the benchmark
years.
The GDI is also distinctly lower than the HDI but shows
increases throughout the period, although at a distinctly slower rate
than that of HDI.  It should be emphasised that these estimates are
very tentative, especially with regard to the income component.
Interestingly, however, on the evidence available at this point, the
relatively slow growth in the GDI accrues primarily from earnings
which stagnate between 1760 and 1830 rather than longevity or
12
education.  In turn, this arises from declining female participation
rates as well as moves in relative wage rates.
Similar to the HDI and again different from the heights
evidence, Table 2 shows that using the Borda Rule to aggregate the
six indicators of the quality of life in the DW Index) also shows a
pattern of steady improvement after 1780 with 1850 emerging as the
best year on this method of aggregation.  Replacing income by
rankings of years based on Feinstein’s recent index of real earnings
produces an identical result.36  At this point, however, it is
opportune to return to the weighting problem since 1850 is not the
best year on all components of the DW index (nor indeed the HDI)
because of the deterioration in mortality after 1830.
Further analysis of the components of the DW index reported
in Table 1 shows that there is some evidence of Pareto Dominance,
namely that 1850 dominates 1760 and 1780, and that 1830
dominates 1760, 1780, and 1820.  Experiments with alternative
weighting schemes found that 1830 is superior on Intersection Borda
ranking to 1800 and 1820 and by the same criterion 1850 is superior
to 1820 and 1820 is superior to 1760.37  Any judgement on 1830
compared with 1850 turns out to be very sensitive to the relative
weights given to life expectancy and infant mortality.  Thus, an
investigator who wished to weight the demographic indicators very
heavily relative to all other components and recalculate an adjusted
Borda Rule ranking on this basis might conclude that quality of life
fell between 1830 and 1850.38 It may be that, in effect, this is what
the heights data is doing.  If so, this would be a valuable warning, as
Section 5 below bears out.
Two points in particular have emerged from this review.  First,
it is often supposed that looking at the overall quality of life would
be more supportive of pessimist views on living standards than
focusing only on real wages.  The hypothesis is not, however,
generally supported by the results in Table 2.  These are not, of
course, conclusive both because the weighting problem still remains,
even if it does not appear acute on these particular indices, and
because there is still room to argue about variables that have been
omitted from the analysis or may have been badly measured.
13
Second, it would appear that considerable caution needs to be
exercised in considering the heights evidence in the context of broad
measures of living standards.  In this period, heights move with some
but not all the non-income components of the ‘quality of life’ and
give different signals from either the HDI or the DW index.  This
seems to confirm both that information on heights is likely to be one
of a number of valuable diagnostics, that movements in real wages or
real GDP per head may not correlate well with changes in well-being
and also that heights are better not used as an index of overall
welfare
4.     INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING
IN
        THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
Other than comparisons of GDP/head, at least until recently,
quantitative comparison of nineteenth century living standards has
been quite rare.  The heights literature now offers some additional
evidence but broader notions of the quality of life have not been
examined.  This section makes an attempt to fill this gap both in the
interests of further enquiry into the value of national accounts as
indicators of comparative living standards and to get some further
purchase on Hartwell and Engerman’s questions.  Once again, the
estimates are made in the hope of encouraging more scholars to join
in.
Table 3 assembles data for a sample of twelve countries similar
to that in Table 1.  The quality of the data is probably quite low but
it may be good enough to draw some interesting conclusions.  It is
not, however, possible at present to compute GDI or Distribution-
Adjusted HDI estimates.  The first four columns of the table appear
to be the best estimates currently available and require no particular
comment.
The estimates on literacy differ in some respects from those
most often quoted, in particular with regard to Sweden.  In
compiling the data, attention has been paid to ability in basic writing
14
rather than simply reading and to female as well as male attainments.
Markussen has recently emphasised that the Nordic countries are
unusual in terms of the time lag between the development of reading
and writing skills and this view is reflected in the table.
39
  The
evidence is mostly based on military recruits and marriage registers.
There is insufficient evidence on schooling to make
international comparisons directly c1860.  More information exists
for later years and I have estimated the following regression on an
international cross-section for 1913:
40
Schooling Years   =   -1.375   +   0.083 Literacy Rate  R2 = 0.75
                         (-1.580)     (7.480)
This is used here to infer years of schooling for Table 3.
The remaining components are, of course, more problematic
and, as far as I am aware, similar estimates have not previously been
attempted.  With regard to political rights, the United States is the
only country in this list which even approaches universal male
suffrage and has a well articulated party system.  Blacks and women
were denied the vote, however, and a 2 is the most that can be
awarded.  The 3s all have low proportions with the vote but
relatively fair elections and Socialists were not outlawed.  The 4s are
essentially ‘constitutional monarchism’ while in the 5s elections
with tiny electorates were ‘massively fixed’.
41
With regard to civil rights, by the 1850s the 1s all have
effective freedom of the press, legal trade unions and do not use
excessive force in law enforcement.  The United States would also
qualify but for the problem of the South and the continuing threat
that it imposed to civil rights, as became clear with the advent of the
Civil War and the powers assumed by President Lincoln.  The 5s in
every case have censorship of the press, no freedom of assembly,
trade unions are illegal and are characterised by Goldstein as
suffering persistent arbitrary use of force in law enforcement.
42
  The
intermediate cases have some but not all of these features.
Table 3 shows Britain with the highest income per head in
1870.  Only in one other category does Britain come out (equal) top,
15
namely in civil rights.  In education Britain ranks third equal, in life
expectancy fifth, and in heights only seventh.  These last two
indicators are surely strongly influenced by the very high level of
urbanisation in Britain and the policy problems to which it gave rise,
a point which will be explored further in the following section.
Nevertheless, as Table 4 reports, Britain ranks top on the HDI
measure and first equal on the DW index.  There are, however, five
countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and USA) over
which Britain neither had Pareto Dominance nor Intersection Borda
Ranking Superiority.  Moreover, Table 4 reports six cases (all
relating to the Nordic countries) where a country has Intersection
Borda Ranking Superiority over the other country despite having a
lower real GDP/person.
The indices compiled in Table 4 are obviously liable to
problems of measurement error.  Nevertheless, they may be adequate
to provide support for the following observations which also build
on the rank correlations reported in Table 5.
(i) Britain’s leadership in income per head carries over to the HDI
and the DW index.  In this respect, at least, the traditional approach
to international comparisons of British living standards does not
appear to be misleading.
(ii) Overall, however, the evidence here is that international
comparisons of living standards in the mid-nineteenth century based
simply on real GDP/head may be less satisfactory than for the recent
past, as is suggested by the conflicts between Intersection Borda
Rankings and national income estimates.  The 0.51 rank order
correlation between the DW index and real GDP per head is a good
deal lower than that found by Dasgupta and Weale for their sample
of developing countries in the 1970s (0.84).
43
(iii) Correlations between the individual components of the quality
of life and real GDP/person are nevertheless similar to those for the
developing countries sample of the 1970s analysed by Dasgupta and
Weale.  They found rank order correlations of 0.69 with infant
16
mortality and 0.59 with literacy whereas for Table 3 these
coefficients are both 0.64.
44
(iv) There is further reason to be sceptical of heights as an overall
index of living standards.  Correlation of heights with both
GDP/head and HDI are notably low.  For Britain, it also appears that
height was lower than in two countries which are Pareto Dominated
in terms of the DW index.
5. EXPLORING SOME COUNTERFACTUALS
Comparative data suggest that British infant mortality was relatively
high and life expectancy relatively low in the mid-nineteenth
century.  These outcomes might, of course, have been addressed by
more effective policy interventions, in particular responding to the
problems arising from rapid urbanisation.  In considering this
possibility, this section takes up the second of Hartwell and
Engerman’s key issues in the standard of living debate.
The response to this question may vary depending on whether
evaluation of likely outcomes is based on the effects in enhancing
capabilities or incomes so that it can clearly be seen as a (famous)
example of the fundamental debate on development priorities raised
by the human development school.
45
  In some cases interventions
may be recommended on both grounds; for example, Solar has
recently argued that the Old Poor Law not only provided a better
system of social security than prevailed elsewhere in eighteenth
century Europe but also tended to promote economic growth.
46
It might be thought that the Borda Rule can be used as a
criterion for the evaluation of policy interventions.  This is not
always the case, however, and on occasions there may be enough
quantitative evidence to overrule this approach.  This can be
illustrated in the context of the standard of living debate by
examining the implications of some estimates by Williamson.
If comparisons of the quality of life are to be made using the
DW index, as in Table 2, a policymaker in 1850 might think an
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intervention would be justified if it led to a situation in which 1850
was at least as good as every previous year on all components of the
Borda index.  Clearly, this would require improvement in life
expectancy and infant mortality and would also imply an
improvement in the Borda Rule score for 1850.  Given the large
discrepancy between rural and urban mortality stressed by Woods,
had there been lower migration from country to town, the required
improvement in demographic conditions could have been achieved.
47
Greater protection rather than free trade might have brought this
about.
48
To reveal the limitations of the Borda Rule criterion, consider
the following illustrative calculation based on the differentials in life
expectancy suggested by Woods and on the computable general
equilibrium estimates of factor market failure provided by
Williamson.
49
  Had the rural population remained at its 71% 1821
share of total population in 1851 instead of falling to 56%, then life
expectancy would have been 1.43 years higher.  In terms of Table 1,
E would rise to 40.9 years and associated with this M would fall to
148.50  Williamson’s model suggests that the fall of 34.1% in non-
rural employment which would be entailed would have cost around
10.4% of GDP through a less efficient allocation of labor, thus
reducing Y in Table 1 to 2550.
51
  This meets the Pareto Dominance
criterion set.
Lower migration could have produced an improvement in the
quality of life according to the Borda Rule.  Yet such quantitative
evidence as we have would call for more migration not less.
Williamson’s regression estimates indicate that real wages were
higher in cities than in the countryside even after allowing for a
substantial urban disamenities premium.  His best guess estimates are
of a real wage gap in the 1830s of 33.2% after adjusting for cost of
living differences and allowing for a disamenities premium of 9.7%.52
Apparently, taking into account the trade-offs willingly made in the
labor market, an inferior environment was outweighed by higher
wages.
In this case, the Borda Rule, confined to ordinal comparisons,
would be misleading and a poor basis for policy advice.  Similarly,
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inferring falling living standards from declines in heights in urban
areas would be wrong.  People presumably did not seek to maximise
height but improved their real standard of living by regarding a worse
environment (and being shorter) plus higher wages as better.
53
  This
underlines the crucial importance of weighting in compiling quality
of life indices and the dangers of employing arbitrary implicit
weights.  The assumptions on which Williamson’s conclusions rely
are, of course, strong but the key point is not the accuracy of his
estimates but the importance of trying to quantify trade-offs in
measuring living standards.
Nevertheless, paying attention to problems of urbanisation
reflected in Britain’s disappointing mortality performance and
heeding the warning signals from the DW index and heights can be
justified.  Recent research has re-interpreted the decline in mortality
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Both Szreter and
Hardy now attribute a high proportion of declining mortality from
infectious diseases to public health initiatives, involving both capital
expenditure on sanitation and education on hygiene.
54
  Szreter’s
discussion implies that this may have accounted for as much as 75%
of the decline in mortality.  In this the enforcement of statutory
duties on local authorities through legislation such as the 1875
Public Health Act and the provision of soft loans through the Local
Government Board were key elements.  The amounts spent on
resources were, in fact, relatively modest — only reaching 2.5% of
GDP in 1900.55
Putting these pieces of information together, it seems plausible
to argue that, with appropriate public intervention, expenditure
equivalent to less than 3% of GDP per year during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century could have raised life expectancy
to about 44.5 years and reduced infant mortality to around 129 in
1850.
56
  This would again satisfy the Borda Rule criterion set out
above and would seem to be recommended on the basis of the
human capabilities approach.
In this case, however, there is also an efficiency argument to be
made along traditional cost benefit lines.  Brown and Williamson
both point out a study of Preston in 1845 which calculates that
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returns from investment in sanitation would far exceed the costs.
57
Brown presents calculations which indicate that for millowners in
the town savings in disamenities premia paid to workers would have
easily outweighed the rental costs of the capital involved.
58
  The
problem seems to have been one of classic market failure —
suboptimal expenditure on public goods in the context of free rider
problems, unequal incidence of benefits and a narrow local tax
base.
59
Overall, then it appears that the historical evidence is that quite
modest public spending increases in mid-nineteenth century Britain
could have enhanced the quality of life and at the same time have
been justified in terms of rate of return.  This is very much consistent
with the contemporary situation in developing countries according to
advocates of the human development approach to policymaking.
Proponents of both income-centered and capabilities-based
approaches to policy formulation could argue for greater public
expenditure and that, in the presence of market failures, policy
interventions were available to improve living standards.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction four specific questions were posed.  The answers
which have been suggested are as follows.
(i) The paper explores a number of ways in which improvements
might be made to private income as a measure of well-being.  The
view taken of changes in living standards is shown to be sensitive to
weighting because of the disparate movements in components of
welfare.  Overall, it appears that moving from income to ‘quality of
life’ measures does not necessarily strengthen the pessimist case in
the standard of living debate despite recent pessimistic inferences
drawn from evidence on heights.
(ii) Comparisons with mid-nineteenth century Europe highlight
disappointing mortality conditions in Britain at the end of the
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industrial revolution.  This is in considerable part clearly due to
unusually rapid British urbanisation.
(iii) In the mid nineteenth century the correlation between real
GDP/person and measures of the quality of life seems to be weaker
than for recent times.  This suggests that an approach to evaluating
economic policy and performance based on capabilities and well-
being may be even more important for economic historians than for
contemporary development economists.
 
(iv) The quality of life approach indicates that there was an
important potential role for public spending in mid-nineteenth
century Britain to enhance capabilities by improving public health.
There is also an efficiency case for intervention based on rates of
return as well as the argument based on well-being.
In the context of Hartwell and Engerman’s three issues in the
standard of living debate, this paper has argued that paying explicit
attention to the quality of life and to international comparisons is
helpful.  Both these compilations of data and indices suggest
strongly that there were interventions to cope with the costs of
urbanisation which could have been beneficial during the industrial
revolution.  At the same time, the strong showing of Britain in the
international comparisons of living standards at least leaves open a
positive answer to their first and most difficult question.
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TABLE 1
Living Standards Indicators in Industrial Revolution Britain
Y H E M L SCH R1 R2
1760 1803 167.4 34.2 174 48.5 1.4 3 3
1780 1787 168.0 34.7 173 49.5 1.5 3 3
1800 1936 168.9 35.9 145 52.5 1.8 3 4
1820 2099 170.7 39.2 154 54.5 2.0 3 4
1830 2209 170.7 40.8 149 57.5 2.3 3 3
1850 2846 165.3 39.5 156 61.5 2.7 3 1
Sources:
Y (GDP/Head): based on Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, Crafts and
Harley, ‘Output Growth’, and Feinstein, ‘Capital Accumulation’.
H (Height of army recruits born at this date when 20-3): from Floud et al,
Heights, Health and History, pp. 142-7.
E (Life expectancy at birth): from Wrigley and Schofield, Population History.
M (Infant mortality): from Wrigley et al, English Population History.
L (Adult literacy rate): from Schofield, ‘Dimensions’, pp. 442, 445.
SCH (Average years of schooling): from Matthews et al, British Economic
Growth, p.573 extrapolated back using literacy rates.
R1 (Political rights index): based on Hawkins, ‘Parliamentary Government’, and
O’Gorman, Voters.
R2 (Civil rights index): based on Aspinall, Politics and The Press, Manchester,
Modern Legal History.  Thompson, Chartists and Wickwar, Struggle.
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TABLE 2
Alternative Indices of Living Standards in
Industrial Revolution Britain
HDI DW Index Distribution
Adjusted HDI
GDI
1760 0.272 6 0.216 0.232
1780 0.277 5 0.240
1800 0.302 4 0.238 0.263
1820 0.337 3 0.283
1830 0.361 2 0.309
1850 0.407 1 0.307/0.321 0.335
Sources:
Derived from Table 1 and Appendix Tables 1 and 2. For description of the
indices see text and for detailed explanation of the derivation of the estimates see
the appendix. The alternative estimates of the Distribution-Adjusted HDI for
1850 are based on Williamson’s estimate for the Gini coefficient of 0.551, Did
British Capitalism, p.68 and Feinstein’s of 0.475, ‘Rise and Fall’, p.723,
respectively.
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TABLE 3
Aspects of Living Standards in Britain
and Its International Peer Group c1860
Y H E M L SCH R1 R2
Britain 3263 165.3 41.2 151 65 4.0 3 1
Belgium 2640 165.5 41.1 165 50 2.8 3 2
Netherlands 2640 165.1 37.7 197 70 4.4 3 2
USA 2457 171.1 41.9 226 65 4.0 2 2
Denmark 1927 166.1 44.5 136 65 4.0 3 1
Germany 1913 164.3 33.0 211 70 4.4 4 5
Austria 1875 167.2 31.7 259 30 1.1 4 4
France 1858 164.7 41.0 179 55 3.2 4 5
Sweden 1664 168.2 44.6 144 55 3.2 3 1
Italy 1467 162.2 27.7 231 20 0.3 5 3
Spain 1376 160.9 33.7 187 25 0.7 5 5
Norway 1303 168.6 48.7 107 35 1.5 3 1
Sources:
Y (GDP/Head, 1870): Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy.
H (Heights, 1850): Austria from Komlos, Nutrition, p. 57; Britain, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, USA from Floud and Steckel, ‘Conclusion’;
Spain from Gomez-Mendoza and Perez-Moreda, ‘Heights and Welfare’;
remainder from Floud, ‘Heights of Europeans’.
E (Life expectancy at birth, 1860): Austria from Helczmanovski, ‘Austria-
Hungary’, Belgium and Netherlands from Deprez, ‘Low Countries’, Britain from
Wrigley and Schofield, Population history, Denmark from Andersen,
‘Denmark’, France and Sweden from Wrigley, People, Germany from Lee,
‘Germany’, Italy from Vallin, ‘Mortality in Europe’, Norway from Dublin et al,
Length of Life, Spain from Poblacion espanola, USA from Haines, ‘Estimated
Life-Tables’.
M (Infant mortality rate): from Chesnais, Demographic Transition except
Germany from Lee, ‘Germany’, and USA from Haines, ‘Estimated Life-Tables’.
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L (Literacy rate): Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy from Cipolla,
Literacy and Development; Denmark and Norway from Markussen,
‘Development of writing’; Netherlands from Adelman and Morris, Comparative
Patterns, Spain from Nunez, ‘Literacy and Economic Growth’, Sweden from
Johansson, History of Literacy; USA from Soltow and Stevens, Rise of Literacy.
SCH (Average years of schooling): estimated from literacy, see text.
R1 (Political rights index): based on Anderson and Anderson, Political
Institutions, Goldstein, Political Repression and, for the USA, Shade, ‘Political
Pluralism’.
R2 (Civil rights index): based on Goldstein, Political Repression, Goldstein,
Political Censorship and, for the USA, Burns and Burns, People’s Charter.
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TABLE 4
Rankings for Britain and Its International Peer Group on
Alternative Indices of Living Standards, c1860
Y HDI DW Index H
Britain 1 1  (0.461) 1= 7
Belgium 2= 5  (0.378) 7 6
Netherlands 2= 2  (0.416) 6 8
USA 4 3  (0.413) 3 1
Denmark 5 4  (0.393) 1= 5
Germany 6 7  (0.343) 8 10
Austria 7 10(0.220) 10 4
France 8 8  (0.342) 9 9
Sweden 9 6  (0.349) 4 3
Italy 10 12(0.143) 12 11
Spain 11 11(0.185) 11 12
Norway 12 9  (0.292) 5 2
Pareto Dominance
Britain: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain.
Belgium: Austria, Italy, Spain.
Netherlands: Austria, Germany, Italy.
USA: Austria, Italy.
Denmark: Austria, France, Italy, Spain.
Intersection Borda Ranking Superiority
Britain: Germany.
Belgium: France
Netherlands: France, Spain
USA: France, Germany, Spain.
Denmark: Belgium, Germany, Sweden
Germany: Spain
Austria: Italy
Sweden: Austria, France.
Norway: Austria, Italy, Spain.
Sources:  derived from Table 3. Figures in parentheses under HDI are th
estimated absolute values. Pareto Dominance and Intersection Borda Ranking
Superiority refer to the DW Index; for definitions, see text.
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TABLE 5
Rank Order Correlations Between Living Standards Indices
Y H DW
Y
H 0.12
DW 0.51 0.64
HDI 0.86 0.26 0.85
Source: Derived from Table 4.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains technical details relevant to the construction
of the DW, HDI and GDI indices discussed in the paper.
Aggregation with the DW index ranks observations using the
Borda rule. In addition, Pareto Dominance requires that an
observation scores at least as well on all variables and better on at
least one than the observation with which it is compared. An
observation is superior to another on Intersection Borda Ranking if,
on all weighting systems where the weights sum to 1 and which
admit each variable with a weight of at least 0.1, it has a higher
Borda rule score.
The following definitions are used to establish the political
rights variable in the DW index:
1: Political systems in which the great majority of persons have both
the right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process.
Political parties may be freely formed for the purpose of making the
right to compete for public office fairly general.
2: Political systems with an open process which does not always
work well, however, due to extreme poverty, a feudal social
structure, violence or other limitations on potential participants or
results. As is the case with countries coded 1, a leader or party can
be voted out of office.
3: Political systems in which people may elect their leaders or
representatives but in which coups d’etat, large-scale interference
with election results, and often non-democratic procedures occur.
4: Systems in which full democratic elections are blocked
constitutionally or have little significance in determining power
distributions.
5: Systems in which elections are closely controlled or limited or in
which the results have little significance.
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6: Political systems without elections or with elections involving
only a single list of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of
demonstrating support for the system.
7: Systems that are tyrannies without legitimacy.
The following definitions are used to establish the civil rights
variable in the DW index.
1: Political systems in which the rule of law is unshaken. Freedom of
expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media.
2: Political systems that aspire to the above level of civil rights but
are unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance, or
unavailability of the media, or because they have restrictive laws that
seem to be greater than are needed for maintaining order.
3: Political systems that have the trappings of civil liberty and whose
governments may be successfully opposed in the courts, although
they may be threatened or have unresolvable political deadlocks and
may often have to rely upon martial law, jailing for sedition, and
suppression of publications.
4: Political systems in which there are broad areas of freedom but
also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a
revolutionary situation or in transition from traditional society may
easily fall into this category.
5: Political systems in which civil rights are often denied but in
which there is no doctrine on which the denial is based. The media
are often weak, controlled by the government and censored.
6: Countries in which no civil rights are thought to take priority over
the rights of the state, although criticism is allowed to be expressed
in limited ways.
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7: Political systems of which the outside world never hears a
criticism except when it is condemned by the state. Citizens have no
rights in relation to the state.
The Human Development Index in Tables 2 and 4 is based on
the 1994 version; this differs in some respects from earlier versions.
It is most easily understood by following the calculation of HDI for
Britain in 1850 using the data in Table 1.
HDI is (indexed life expectancy + indexed educational
attainment + indexed adjusted income)/3. In each case the indexed
figure is based on how far the country has progressed between the
assumed minimum and the maximum values and lies between 0 and
1. The indexed values are calculated as follows.
(a)  Life Expectancy
 
39.5 - 25.0  =  14.5   =   0.242
     85.0 - 25.0      60.0
where 39.5 years is the estimate of life expectancy for 1850, 85 years
is the assumed maximum achievable and 25 years is taken to be the
minimum value possible.
(b) Educational Attainment
This has two components based on the literacy rate and schooling.
The literacy rate (61.5%) is regarded as already an appropriate index
since the maximum feasible is 100% and the minimum 0%. Years of
schooling have an assumed maximum of 15 years and a minimum of
0 years and are thus indexed as
2.7 - 0.0    =   0.180
15.0 - 0.0
The educational attainment index is a weighted average of the two
components = 2(0.615) + 0.180  =  0.470.
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(c) Income
Income is discounted heavily over a certain threshold such that the
maximum adjusted income is $5385. Minimum income is taken to be
$200. British income in 1850 is below the threshold where
adjustment starts and the indexed income figure is therefore
                  2846 - 200   =  2646   =  0.510
                  5385 - 200       5185
Therefore HDI = (0.242 + 0.470 + 0.510)/3  =  0.407.
To obtain the Distribution-Adjusted HDI the income variable is
multiplied by (1 — Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality) prior to
obtaining the indexed income figure. Thus for Williamson’s estimate
of G = 0.55 the income figure relevant to this measure is
                   2846(0.45) - 200   =  1080.7   =  0.208
                        5385 -200             5185
Therefore the Distribution-Adjusted HDI = (0.242 + 0.470 +
0.208)/3  =  0.307.
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is a further
development of HDI to take account of disparities between men and
women. It is a good deal more demanding on data and involves value
judgements about the extent to which these disparities are regarded
as undesirable; at present the UN adopts a standard assumption on
this and the present estimates use the same assumption. The index
requires separate estimates for men and women of life expectancy,
educational attainment and income. These data are set out in
Appendix Table 1.
    GDI is an average of ‘equally distributed’ indices of the usual
three components. These indices are set out in Appendix Table 2.
The calculation of these for 1850 follows.
(a) Life Expectancy
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Maximum and minimum values are assumed to differ: 87.5 and 27.5
for women, 82.5 and 22.5 for men. Proceeding as before, in 1850
this gives a female index of (40.47-27.5)/60 = 0.216 and a male
index of (38.53-22.5)/60 = 0.267. These are combined using the
population proportions female (0.5103) and male (0.4897) using the
following formula, which embodies the degree of inequality
aversion, to obtain the equally distributed index:
    [ 0.5103(0.216)-1  +  0.4897(0.267)-1 ]-1    =  0.238
(b) Educational Attainment
Gender differentials in schooling were assumed to be the same as in
literacy. The measurement of eduactional attainment is carried out as
for the HDI but separately for each gender. Schooling is assumed in
1850 to have been 3.32 years for men and 2.08 years for women.
Proceeding as before, this gives educational attainment indices of
0.534 for men and 0.406 for women. These are then combined to
obtain the equally distributed index as follows:
    [ 0.5103(0.406)-1  +  0.4897(0.534)-1 ]-1    =  0.460
(c) Income
The income index is arrived at using estimates of proportional
income shares by gender to derive an equally distributed income
coefficient as follows:
    [ 0.5103(0.398)-1  +  0.4897(1.602)-1 ]-1    =  0.630
This is then used to adjust the income estimate (2846 x 0.630)
before inserting this into the income attainment formula. Thus we
have
    (2846 x 0.630) - 200   =   0.307
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     5385 - 200
The GDI is then simply (0.238  + 0.460  + 0.307)/3  =  0.335.
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APPENDIX TABLE  1
Gender Specific Data on Components of HDI
Life Expectancy     Literacy Income Shares
F M F M F M
1760 33.9 34.5 36 61 0.560 1.44
0
1780 34.1 35.3 39 60 0.558 1.44
4
1800 36.2 35.6 42 63 0.528 1.47
3
1820 40.3 38.1 46 63 0.409 1.59
2
1830 41.9 39.7 51 64 0.420 1.58
1
1850 40.5 38.5 54 69 0.398 1.60
2
Sources:
Life expectancy data for 1760 and 1780 from Wrigley et al, English Population;
for 1850 based on the standard English life-table and for intermediate years the
gender relativities for Quakers in Vann and Eversley, Friends, p.228 are used to
adjust the aggregate estimates in Table 1.
Literacy data from Schofield, ‘Dimensions’, p.445.
Income shares require information on participation rates and on relative
earnings. This is very sparse and what is available must be regarded as of
dubious quality. I have relied on ongoing unpublished research by Charles
Feinstein who has kindly allowed me to make use of his provisional estimates.
The earnings differentials are based on female domestic servants relative to male
building workers. Female participation rates are assumed to follow a pattern
similar to that implied by the results in Horrell and Humphries, ‘Old Questions’.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
Equally Distributed Indices for Compiling GDI
Life Expectancy Educational
Attainment
Income
1760 0.138 0.320 0.239
1780 0.145 0.339 0.236
1800 0.174 0.367 0.248
1820 0.234 0.394 0.222
1830 0.261 0.426 0.241
1850 0.238 0.460 0.307
Source: derived from Appendix Table 1 using the methods described in this
appendix.
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